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Abstract
Platform sharing across manufacturers has recently become common practice in the
automobile industry. Its important objective is to reduce procurement costs by tak-
ing advantage of the commonality of components, but this often reduces the degree
of product diﬀerentiation. We investigate this trade-oﬀ through analyzing a model
that incorporates manufacturer-supplier relationships with communication costs into
a standard diﬀerentiated duopoly model, and ﬁnd an interesting inverse relation-
ship between the advantage of platform sharing and the costs for manufacturers to
communicate with their potential suppliers. The result suggests that the information-
technology revolution could be a reason for the recent prevalence of platform sharing
in the automobile industry, and predicts that similar phenomena would prevail in
various other industries as the IT revolution makes further progress. We then con-
sider an extension of our model that incorporates an option for the manufacturers to
jointly establish a B2B electronic marketplace in order to reduce their communica-
tion costs, and explore its welfare implications. Although the joint establishment of
an e-marketplace could be viewed as an anticompetitive activity, we ﬁnd that in our
framework it increases welfare.
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Platform sharing across manufacturers has recently become common practice in the automo-
bile industry, where platform means the core framework of cars that includes the ﬂoorpan,
drive train, and axles (see, e.g., Tierney et al. (2000) for platform sharing between Renault
and Nissan, and Corbett and Wielgat (2000) for platform sharing between Fiat and GM).
An important objective of platform sharing is to reduce procurement costs by taking ad-
vantage of the commonality of components. According to Tierney et al. (2000), Renault’s
chairman mentioned, “We will have common platforms and common engines with Nissan,
which means we are giving suppliers increased volumes”. On the other hand, the use of
diﬀerentiated components is one of the most important means by which downstream ﬁrms
diﬀerentiate their products (Pepall and Norman (2001)). Robertson and Ulrich (1998) point
out, as an example, that the instrument panels for two diﬀerent automobile models lose more
and more distinctiveness as more and more parts are shared between the two models.
This paper analyzes the trade-oﬀ between commonality of components and distinctiveness
of products. We consider a model that incorporates manufacturer-supplier relationships
with communication costs into a standard diﬀerentiated duopoly framework (due to Dixit
(1979) and Singh and Vives (1984)). The degree of product diﬀerentiation is endogenously
determined in our model. Consider an industry consisting of two manufacturers who compete
against each other by producing diﬀerentiated products. In order to produce a product, each
manufacturer must procure a component (call it a part) from a supplier. There is a free entry
of suppliers, where each supplier incurs a ﬁxed cost to enter. Each supplier has a constant
marginal cost of production, which has a random component. The two manufacturers jointly
determine whether to use a common (or similar) part or distinctive parts, and then suppliers
make entry decisions. Upon entry, each supplier privately observes its own constant marginal
2cost. Each manufacturer then determines the number of suppliers with which it will exchange
detailed information on requirements such as timeliness and ﬂexibility of delivery, product
design, and allowance for defection rates, where it incurs a ﬁxed amount of communication
cost per supplier. Each manufacturer then chooses one supplier through a procurement
auction.
The model captures the trade-oﬀ between commonality of components and distinctiveness
of products by assuming that the use of a common (or similar) part reduces the degree of
product diﬀerentiation. We label the use of a common part as “platform sharing”. Under
platform sharing, one supplier can serve both manufacturers. On the other hand, one supplier
can serve at most one manufacturer if they do not share a platform, because each supplier
must choose one distinctive part to specialize in.
We ﬁnd that, under platform sharing, each manufacturer can choose a supplier from a
larger number of potential suppliers, which in turn lowers each manufacturer’s expected price
for procurement. To understand the logic, let us suppose for now that the communication
cost is zero so that each manufacturer communicates with all relevant entrants. Under
platform sharing, an entrant with the lowest cost wins both procurement auctions and sells
a common part to both manufacturers. On the other hand, if the manufacturers do not share
a platform, an entrant with the lowest cost among competitors can sell a distinctive part
to only one manufacturer. In both cases, in equilibrium each entrant’s post-entry expected
proﬁt is equal to the ﬁxed cost of entry because of the zero proﬁt condition due to free entry.
This in turn means that, in equilibrium, competition among relevant entrants is tougher
under platform sharing, because the winner can serve both manufacturers. The advantage
of this, from the manufacturers’ standpoint, is that each manufacturer can choose a supplier
from a larger number of relevant entrants under platform sharing.
The result is that the two manufacturers share a platform if the reduction of product
3diﬀerentiation due to platform sharing is relatively small, and each manufacturer’s commu-
nication cost per supplier is relatively small as well. Here we observe an interesting inverse
relationship between the advantage of platform sharing and the level of communication costs.
As described above, the advantage of platform sharing in our framework is that each man-
ufacturer can lower its expected procurement costs by choosing a supplier from a larger
number of potential suppliers. Since each manufacturer must incur a ﬁxed amount of com-
munication costs in order to exchange detailed information with a potential supplier, the
advantage of platform sharing decreases as the level of communication costs increases.
Concerning welfare consequences of platform sharing, we ﬁnd that, if the two manufac-
turers choose to share a platform, the decision increases consumer surplus as well as total
surplus. Platform sharing reduces the level of product diﬀerentiation, which in turn in-
tensiﬁes competition between the two manufacturers. We ﬁnd that, from the consumers’
standpoint, the former negative eﬀect of platform sharing (reduction of product variety) is
oﬀset by the latter positive eﬀect (lower price due to intense competition) when platform
sharing increases the manufacturers’ proﬁts. Then, noting that each supplier’s expected
proﬁt is zero due to free entry, platform sharing increases the total surplus as well.
The rapid spread of electronic commerce, due to recent advances in information technol-
ogy, is substantially changing the nature of manufacturer-supplier relationships. One impor-
tant recent phenomenon is the formation of industry consortiums for establishing business-
to-business (B2B) electronic marketplaces such as Covisint in the automobile industry, which
can substantially reduce buyers’ communication costs for exchanging detailed information
with potential suppliers. For example, according to Covisint’s web page1, when procuring
an intermediate product automobile manufacturers typically choose several potential sup-
pliers and issue a Request for Quote (RFQ) that speciﬁes detailed requirements on product
1http://www.covisint.com/solutions/proc/qm.shtml, visited July 9, 2002.
4design, delivery and shipping terms, quality goals and so on, to which the potential suppliers
respond. Frequently this process entails multiple rounds of review, collation and revision.
In a case study presented on the web page, a Senior Buyer at General Motors commented,
“Typically, much of the time during the sourcing process is in passing the documentation
back and forth between the supplier and the buyer ... In order to clarify the information sev-
eral rounds of document exchanges are necessary. This exchange takes up valuable sourcing
time during an already short sourcing window.” She then said, “With Covisint, we could ex-
change documents and revisions electronically ... The exchange of information was handled
quickly and eﬃciently. I was able to spend more time on the value added portion of my job
- analyzing the quote responses.”2
In Section 4 we consider an extension of our model that incorporates an option for the
two manufacturers to jointly establish a B2B electronic marketplace (e-marketplace) in order
to reduce their costs for communicating with potential suppliers, and explore its welfare
implications. The establishment of an e-marketplace could be viewed as an anticompetitive
activity when accompanied by platform sharing, because it induces the manufacturers to
reduce their procurement costs at the expense of reduced product variety. Our results
show, however, that the establishment of an e-marketplace increases total surplus as well
as consumer surplus, as long as the manufacturers compete in the product market.
This paper contributes to the theoretical analyses of product diﬀerentiation by endogeniz-
ing the degree of product diﬀerentiation, which is aﬀected by the nature of inputs procured
from upstream suppliers. Pepall and Norman (2001) recently made an important contri-
bution to this unexplored area of research. They considered a model in which downstream
manufacturers diﬀerentiate their products by using diﬀerent combinations of diﬀerentiated
2See also, e.g., Kauﬀman and Walden (2001) and Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001) for related
discussions.
5inputs procured from upstream suppliers, and compared ﬁrms’ proﬁtability under several
types of alliances across manufacturers and/or suppliers.
We make a contribution complementary to their work by addressing the trade-oﬀ between
commonality of inputs and the degree of product diﬀerentiation, and exploring its implica-
tions on the nature of product-market competition and manufacturer-supplier relationships.
Our model indicates an interesting inverse relationship between the advantage of platform
sharing and the level of communication costs, which yields a prediction that phenomena
similar to the platform sharing in the automobile industry would prevail in various other
industries as the information-technology revolution makes further progress. Furthermore,
an extension of our model described above makes a contribution to current antitrust inves-
tigations regarding B2B electronic marketplaces by proposing a theoretical framework for
analysis.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that incorporates manufacturer-
supplier relationships with communication costs into a standard diﬀerentiated duopoly model.
Section 3 analyzes the model and explores its welfare consequences. Section 4 considers an
extension of the model in which the downstream manufacturers have an option of jointly
establishing a B2B electronic marketplace in order to reduce their costs for communicating
with potential suppliers, and discusses its welfare implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We incorporate manufacturer-supplier relationships with communication costs into a stan-
dard diﬀerentiated duopoly model due to Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984). Con-
sider an economy consisting of an industry with two manufacturers who compete against
each other by producing diﬀerentiated products, and a competitive numeraire sector whose
6output is denoted q0. There is a free entry of suppliers to the industry, where each supplier
incurs a ﬁxed cost f > 0 to enter. The manufacturers and the suppliers are risk neutral.
Each manufacturer i (=1, 2) produces product i, and let pi and qi denote the price and the
quantity of product i, respectively. There is a continuum of consumers of the same type, and
the representative consumer’s preferences are described by the utility function U(q1,q2)+q0,
where U(q1,q2) = A(q1 +q2)−(q2
1 +2γq1q2 +q2
2)/2, A > 0, and γ ∈ (0,1). This yields linear
inverse demands
p1 = A − q1 − γq2 (1)
p2 = A − q2 − γq1. (2)
The degree of product diﬀerentiation decreases as γ increases.
Each manufacturer i must procure one unit of an intermediate product (call it a part)
from a supplier in order to produce one unit of product i. The two manufacturers jointly
determine whether to use a common (or similar) part or distinctive parts (we label the use
of a common part as platform sharing), and then suppliers make entry decisions. Each
manufacturer then determines the number of suppliers with which it exchanges detailed
information on requirements such as timeliness and ﬂexibility of delivery, product design,
and allowance for defection rates, where it must incur communication cost z(≥ 0) per supplier
(see Introduction for an illustration of the substance of such costs). Each manufacturer i’s
cost for producing qi units of product i is given by µqi + procurement costs, where µ denotes
the constant marginal cost for production. We normalize µ to be zero. Communication in
our model is similar to a “link” considered in a recent innovative analysis of networks by
Kranton and Minehart (2001).3
3In their model, a buyer and seller must have a relationship, or “link”, to exchange goods, where a link is
anything that makes possible or adds value to a particular bilateral exchange. Buyers form links by incurring
a ﬁxed amount of cost per each link, then compete to obtain goods from their linked suppliers. Kranton and
7We consider the four-stage game described below.
[Stage 1] The two manufacturers jointly determine whether or not to share a platform
of their products. If they do not share a platform, each manufacturer i uses a distinctive
part (call it part i) for producing product i, and the parameter γ is given by γ = γ0,
where γ0 ∈ (0,1). On the other hand, if they share a platform, the two manufacturers
use a common part, and the parameter γ is given by γ = γ0 + x, where x ∈ (0,1 − γ0).
The manufacturers’ decision becomes common knowledge. This speciﬁcation captures a
trade-oﬀ between commonality of parts and distinctiveness of products. That is, if the two
manufacturers use a common part, the degree of product diﬀerentiation decreases by x.
[Stage 2] Suppliers make entry decisions. There is a free entry of suppliers, and each supplier
incurs a ﬁxed cost f > 0 if it enters. If the two manufacturers chose not to share a platform
in the previous stage, each supplier must determine whether to specialize in part 1 or part 2;
a single supplier cannot produce both part 1 and part 2. Suppliers’ entry decisions become
common knowledge. Each supplier s (=1, 2, ...) has a constant marginal cost of production
given by cs = c − s, where c ∈ (0,A) and s is a random variable. Assume that s is
identically and independently distributed according to a uniform distribution between 0 and
k ∈ (0,c). The realization of s is ex ante unknown. If supplier s enters, it privately observes
the realization of s after the entry.
[Stage 3] Each manufacturer i determines the number of suppliers to communicate with,
where each manufacturer i must incur a communication cost of z(≥ 0) per supplier.
Minehart showed that buyers and sellers, acting strategically in their own self-interests, can form the link
pattern (or network structures) that maximizes overall welfare.
Although related, our model is distinctively diﬀerent from theirs. We explicitly model the strategic in-
teraction between manufacturers (or buyers) in their product market and analyze, among other things, the
relationship between the advantage of platform sharing and the level of communication cost.
8[Stage 4] Each manufacturer i simultaneously and non-cooperatively announces pi, and
consumers make purchase decisions. Each manufacturer i then conducts a procurement
auction among ni suppliers it communicated with at the previous stage, and purchases parts
from one supplier. The auction is designed by each manufacturer i so as to maximize its
expected proﬁt. Each manufacturer i then produces and delivers product i.
3 Analysis
The game described above has two Stage 2 subgames. One is the subgame in which the two
manufactures did not share a platform at Stage 1, while the other is the one in which they
shared a platform. We consider the symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE)
of each subgame, and characterize an equilibrium of the entire game. We consider an equi-
librium in which the two manufacturers jointly decide whether or not to share a platform
at Stage 1 so that each manufacturer’s expected proﬁt in the subsequent symmetric SPNE
outcome is maximized. We will ﬁrst outline the analysis of the model using backwards in-
duction, and then present the main results in Propositions 1 and 2. Throughout the analysis,
we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: f < 1
(1+γ0)(2−γ0)(A − c)k
2.
Assumption 2: z <
1−(γ0+x)
(1+γ0+x)[2−(γ0+x)]2(A − c)2 ≡ ¯ z.
Assumption 3: A > c +
2+k−(γ0+x)
1−(γ0+x) .
Assumption 1 implies that the entry cost for suppliers is small enough so that at least
one supplier enters in order to supply parts to each manufacturer i in equilibrium, and
Assumption 2 says that the communication cost is low enough so that each manufacturer
9communicates with at least one supplier in equilibrium. Also, Assumptions 1-3 together
imply that each manufacturer i always purchases parts through a procurement auction in
equilibrium. These assumptions are not crucial for our results, but simplify the analysis and
the statement of propositions. Note, all proofs are in the Appendix.
Consider a Stage 4 subgame in which the two manufacturers did not share a platform
at Stage 1, and at Stage 3 each manufacturer i communicated with ni(≥ 1) suppliers who
specialized in part i at Stage 2. Suppose that the two manufacturers announced the prices
(p1,p2) at Stage 4, which determines the demand for each product i (denoted qi ≥ 0). The
standard result of auction theory indicates that, in an optimal procurement auction, each
manufacturer i procures qi units of part i from a supplier who realized the lowest production
cost among ni suppliers it communicated with, and that the expected price of the part is
equal to the second lowest realization of the production cost among ni suppliers if ni ≥ 2 and
c if ni = 1 (see, e.g., Myerson (1981)).4 The expected value of each manufacturer i’s constant
marginal cost for production is then c −
ni−1
ni+1k ≡ ˜ ci.5 Noting that the two manufacturers





(1 − γ)(2 + γ)A + 2˜ ci + γ ˜ cj




(1 − γ)(2 + γ)A − (2 − γ2)˜ ci + γ ˜ cj





[(1 − γ)(2 + γ)A − (2 − γ2)˜ ci + γ ˜ cj]2
(1 − γ2)(4 − γ2)2 − niz ≡ π
m
i (γ,z,ni,nj), (5)
where i,j = 1,2,i 6= j, p∗
i(q∗
i) denotes equilibrium price (quantity) of product i, π∗
i denotes
manufacturer i’s expected proﬁt in equilibrium, and γ = γ0.
4More precisely, Assumption 3, along with Assumption 1 and 2, guarantees that each manufacturer
i purchases qi units of part i with probability one through a procurement auction in equilibrium. See
Appendix for details.
5The expected value of lth order statistic from a uniform (0,1) is l
n+1.
10A supplier with whom manufacturer i communicated at Stage 3 wins the procurement
auction with probability 1
ni and, if it wins, it sells qi(γ,ni,nj) units of part i to manufacturer
i. The expected price of part i is c −
ni−1
ni+1k and the expected constant marginal cost of the
winning supplier is c−
ni




which is equal to
(1 − γ)(2 + γ)A − (2 − γ2)˜ ci + γ ˜ cj





− f ≡ π
s
i(γ,ni,nj) − f, (6)
where γ = γ0.
Now consider a Stage 4 subgame in which the two manufacturers shared a platform
at Stage 1, and at Stage 3 each manufacturer i communicated with ni(≥ 1) suppliers.
Through an analogous procedure, we ﬁnd that the SPNE outcome of the Stage 4 subgame
is characterized by p∗
i = pi(γ0 +x,ni,nj), q∗
i = qi(γ0 +x,ni,nj), and π∗
i = πm
i (γ0 +x,ni,nj),
where pi(·,·,·), qi(·,·,·), and πm
i (·,·,·) are as deﬁned in (3)-(5) above. Also, a supplier’s
expected proﬁt in the SPNE outcome is πs
i(γ0 + x,ni,nj) − f if it is communicated by
manufacturer i only, and πs
1(γ0 + x,n1,n2) + πs
2(γ0 + x,n2,n1) − f if it is communicated by
both manufacturers.
In what follows we proceed our analysis by treating the number of suppliers as a con-
tinuous variable. Lemma 1 below identiﬁes each manufacturer i’s expected proﬁt in the
symmetric SPNE outcome of a Stage 2 subgame. We deﬁne nc and nd by
2π
s
i(γ0 + x,nc,nc) − f = 0,π
s
i(γ0,nd,nd) − f = 0. (7)
Here, nc is the number of suppliers that enter in equilibrium if the communication cost is
zero and the two manufactures share a platform (subscript c is for common part), and nd is
the number of suppliers that enter and specialize in part i (=1 or 2) if the communication
cost is zero and the two manufacturers do not share a platform (subscript d is for distinctive





where n(γ,z) is the number of suppliers each manufacturer communicates with in the sym-
metric SPNE outcome of the Stage 3 subgame in which a suﬃciently large number of suppliers
entered in the previous period. In the proof of Lemma 1, we show that nc, nd and n(γ,z)
are all uniquely determined by (7) and (8) above.
Lemma 1: Let ˜ nc(z) ≡ Min[n(γ0 + x,z),nc] and ˜ nd(z) ≡ Min[n(γ0,z),nd]. In the
symmetric SPNE outcome of a Stage 2 subgame, each manufacturer i’s expected proﬁt
is πm
i (γ0 + x,z, ˜ nc(z), ˜ nc(z)) if the two manufacturers shared a platform at Stage 1, and
πm
i (γ0,z, ˜ nd(z), ˜ nd(z)) otherwise.
To understand Lemma 1, consider a Stage 2 subgame in which the two manufacturers
shared a platform at Stage 1. Let the communication cost z be equal to zero for now. Each
manufacturer then communicates with all n suppliers that enter at Stage 2, and hence each
supplier’s expected proﬁt is 2πs
i(γ0 + x,n,n) − f. Since suppliers anticipate this, nc(≥ 1)
suppliers enter in equilibrium because 2πs
i(γ0+x,nc,nc)−f is equal to zero by the deﬁnition
of nc. This continues to hold as long as the communication cost z is low enough such that
n(γ0+x,z) ≥ nc holds. However, if n(γ0+x,z) < nc holds, the communication cost is so high
that each manufacturer communicates with only n(γ0 + x,z) suppliers, which is less than
the number of suppliers that enter. This implies that each manufacture’s expected proﬁt in
equilibrium is πm
i (γ0 + x,z, ˜ nc(z), ˜ nc(z)). A similar logic holds for the Stage 2 subgame in
which the two manufacturers did not share a platform at Stage 1.
We now consider the equilibrium of the entire game. Lemma 1 implies that in the
equilibrium the two manufacturers choose to share a platform at Stage 1 if and only if
12πm
i (γ0 + x,z, ˜ nc(z), ˜ nc(z)) > πm
i (γ0,z, ˜ nd(z), ˜ nd(z)) holds.
Proposition 1: For any given parameterization, there exists a unique value ¯ x ∈ (0,1 − γ0)
such that, in the equilibrium,
(i) if x > ¯ x, the two manufacturers do not share a platform.
(ii) if x < ¯ x, there exists a unique value z∗ ∈ (0, ¯ z] such that the two manufacturers share
a platform if and only if z < z∗. There exists a range of parameterizations in which z∗ < ¯ z
holds.
To understand Proposition 1, let the communication cost z be equal to zero for now.
The proposition then tells us that the two manufacturers share a platform if the reduction
of product diﬀerentiation due to platform sharing, captured by x, is relatively small.
The result is due to the trade-oﬀ between the commonality of parts and the distinctive-
ness of products. Note that each manufacturer communicates with all relevant suppliers
because the communication cost z is zero. Then, under platform sharing, a supplier with
the lowest realization of the production cost sells the common part to both manufacturer 1
and 2 by winning both procurement auctions. In contrast, if the two manufacturers do not
share a platform, a supplier can sell a distinctive part to at most one manufacturer. Hence
a supplier’s expected proﬁt, provided that it wins the procurement auction(s), is higher un-
der platform sharing. This implies that the number of suppliers that enter under platform
sharing is greater than the number of suppliers that enter and specialize in part i under
non-platform sharing. That is, under platform sharing, each manufacturer can choose a sup-
plier from a larger number of potential suppliers, which in turn lowers each manufacturer’s
expected price for procurement. This is the advantage of platform sharing. On the other
hand, platform sharing reduces the extent of product diﬀerentiation between the two man-
ufacturers, which lowers each manufacturer’s proﬁtability by intensifying their competition
13in the product market. If the latter eﬀect, captured by parameter x, is relatively small, the
two manufacturers share a platform.
Now let us allow the communication cost z to take positive values. Our model suggests
an interesting relationship between platform sharing and communication costs. That is,
Proposition 1 says that, given x < ¯ x, the two manufacturers share a platform if and only if the
communication cost z is low enough. This is because, as described in the previous paragraph,
the advantage of platform sharing is that each manufacturer can choose a supplier from a
larger number of potential suppliers. Since each manufacturer must pay communication
cost z in order to exchange detailed information with a potential supplier, the advantage of
platform sharing decreases as the communication cost increases and the two manufacturers
do not share a platform if the communication cost is greater than a threshold z∗.
It is widely recognized that recent advances in information technology (IT revolution) can
substantially reduce communication costs among ﬁrms. Our model then suggests that the
IT revolution can be a reason for the recent prevalence of platform sharing in the automobile
industry, and predicts that similar phenomena would prevail in other industries as the IT
revolution makes further progress. In the next section, we will explore an extension that
incorporates the IT revolution in our framework.
Next we analyze welfare consequences of platform sharing. In Proposition 2, we compare
the Stage 2 subgame in which the two manufacturers shared a platform at the previous stage
and the Stage 2 subgame in which the manufacturers did not share a platform.
Proposition 2: Let CSc (CSd) denote the consumer surplus in the symmetric SPNE out-
come of the Stage 2 subgame in which the two manufacturers shared (did not share) a
platform at the previous stage, and deﬁne TSc and TSd analogously for expected total sur-
plus. Then, CSc > CSd and TSc > TSd if x < ¯ x and z < z∗.
14From Proposition 1 we know that the two manufacturers choose to share a platform if
x < ¯ x and z < z∗ (that is, if the reduction of product diﬀerentiation due to platform sharing is
relatively small and the level of communication cost is also relatively small). Platform sharing
reduces the level of product diﬀerentiation, which in turn induces more intense competition
between the two manufacturers. Proposition 2 tells us that, from the consumers’ standpoint,
the former negative eﬀect of platform sharing (the reduction of product variety) is oﬀset by
the latter positive eﬀect (a lower price due to intense competition) when platform sharing
increases the manufacturers’ proﬁts. Then, noting that each supplier’s expected proﬁt is
zero due to free entry, platform sharing increases the total surplus as well.
Logic behind the result is as follows. Platform sharing intensiﬁes the competition between
the two manufacturers, which in turn reduces the share of total surplus captured by the two
manufacturers as their aggregate proﬁt. However, the level of their aggregate proﬁt is higher
under platform sharing if x < ¯ x and z < z∗ because the manufacturers choose to share a
platform. This means that total surplus is higher under platform sharing, which in turn
implies that consumer surplus is also higher because consumers capture larger share of total
surplus under platform sharing.
4 An application to e-commerce
The rapid spread of electronic commerce, due to recent advances in information technol-
ogy (IT revolution), is substantially changing the nature of manufacturer-supplier relation-
ships. Kalakota and Robinson (2000) argue that the rise of Internet trading exchanges alters
the process by which raw materials and supplies are procured and supply chains are inte-
grated (see also Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001)). One important recent phenomenon
in the Internet trading exchanges is the formation of industry consortiums for establishing
15business-to-business (B2B) electronic marketplaces. One of the most well-known consor-
tiums is Covisint, which was founded by DaimlerChrysler, Ford, General Motors, Nissan,
Renault, Commerce One and Oracle, and which launched the exchange in September 2000.6
B2B electronic marketplaces such as Covisint can substantially reduce buyers’ communica-
tion costs for exchanging detailed information with potential suppliers (see Introduction for
an illustration).
In this section, we analyze an extension of our model that incorporates an option for the
two manufacturers to jointly establish a B2B electronic marketplace (e-marketplace here-
after) in order to reduce their costs for communicating with potential suppliers, and explore
its welfare implications. According to Jacob (2001), U.S. regulators are concerned about
the possibility that e-marketplaces would facilitate collusion among buyer-participants, and
suppliers’ prices would be forced down to unacceptable levels as a consequence (see also
Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001)).7 In September 2001 the Federal Trade Commission
completed its investigation to determine whether the formulation of Covisint violates the
Clayton Act, which was the Commission’s ﬁrst investigation on electronic-procurement mar-
ketplaces. It permitted Covisint to proceed. At the same time, however, the Commission
noted that it cannot say that implementation of the Covisint venture will not cause compet-
itive concerns, and reserved the right to take such further actions as the public interest may
require.8 According to the Commission, “The growth of Internet-based electronic commerce
6According to the Covisint’s web page, “Covisint is the central hub where OEMs and suppliers of all
sizes come together to do business in a single business environment using the same tools and user interface,
plus one user id and password” (http://www.covisint.com/about/, visited July 9, 2002). Other examples of
B2B electronic marketplaces include Exostar in the aerospace and defense industry and Aeroxchange in the
airline industry.
7Jacob also pointed out that large ﬁrms in Europe and Australia have also established e-marketplaces
that have attracted similar regulatory attention.
8According to a press release by the FTC (available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/covisint.htm
16is occurring so rapidly that the likely business and policy consequences are just beginning
to be understood. Not surprisingly, scholarship is limited on the implications of e-commerce
for competition policy.”9
In this section we attempt to make a contribution to this important recent antitrust
issue by proposing a theoretical framework for analysis. We consider the ﬁve-stage game
described below, in which the two manufacturers can jointly establish an e-marketplace in
order to reduce their communication costs.
[Stage 1] The two manufacturers jointly determine whether or not to establish an e-
marketplace. If they do, each manufacturer i must incur a ﬁxed cost I > 0.10
[Stage 2] Same as Stage 1 in the original model, where the two manufacturers jointly
determine whether or not to share a platform of their products.
[Stage 3] Same as Stage 2 in the original model, where suppliers make entry decisions.
[Stage 4] Each manufacturer i determines the number of suppliers to communicate with,
where each manufacturer i must incur communication cost z(≥ 0) per supplier. The com-
munication cost is given by z = z0 − ∆ if an e-marketplace was established at Stage 1, and
(visited July 9, 2002)), “... the Commission noted that, because Covisint is in the early stages of its
development and has not yet adopted bylaws, operating rules, or terms for participant access, because it
is not yet operational, and because its founders represent such a large share of the automobile market, the
Commission cannot say that implementation of the Covisint venture will not cause competitive concerns.”
9See The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee Final Report 2000 (available at
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/icpac/ﬁnalreport.htm (visited November 20, 2001)).
10Each manufacturer would not independently establish an e-marketplace for its own exclusive use by
incurring a ﬁxed cost of 2I, even if we incorporated this as an option.
Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001) classify ownership of B2B e-marketplaces into three categories: inde-
pendent ﬁrms that operate a website, traditional dealers who also operate on-line markets, and industry-
operated exchanges. They argue that e-marketplaces for a few buyers and many suppliers tend to be owned
by buyers (i.e., industry-operated exchanges). Consistent with this observation, we assume that it is the two
manufacturers who invest in the establishment of an e-marketplace.
17z = z0 otherwise, where z0 ≥ ∆ > 0.11
[Stage 5] Same as Stage 4 in the original model, where Bertrand competition between the
two manufacturers take place followed by procurement auctions.
As in the previous section, we consider the symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
(SPNE) of each of the two Stage 3 subgames, and characterize an equilibrium of the entire
game. We consider an equilibrium in which the two manufacturers jointly make decisions
concerning an e-marketplace and platform sharing at Stages 1 and 2 respectively, so that each
manufacturer’s expected proﬁt in the subsequent symmetric SPNE outcome is maximized.
As in the previous section, we make Assumptions 1-3, where in this section we assume that
Assumption 2 holds when z = z0.
Proposition 3: For any given parameterization, there exists a unique value ¯ I > 0 such that,
in the equilibrium, the two manufacturers establish an e-marketplace if and only if I < ¯ I,
where ¯ I is increasing in ∆.
Proposition 3 simply says that the two manufacturers establish an e-marketplace if the re-
quired level of investment is relatively small. The threshold level of investment ¯ I increases as
the reduction of the communication cost due to the e-marketplace (captured by ∆) increases.
We now turn to welfare implications of the establishment of an e-marketplace. We com-
pare the Stage 2 subgame in which the two manufacturers established an e-marketplace at
the previous stage (call it Marketplace Subgame) and the Stage 2 subgame in which the
manufacturers did not establish it (call it non-Marketplace Subgame).
11Our model focuses on the reduction of the cost of procurement before the transaction. As pointed out
by Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001), e-marketplaces also reduce the cost of procurement during and after
the transaction. The qualitative nature of our results would be unchanged when the reduction of these costs
are also incorporated into the model.
18Proposition 4: Let CS0(CS00) denote the consumer surplus in the equilibrium of the Stage
2 subgame in which the two manufacturers established (did not establish) an e-marketplace
at the previous stage, and deﬁne TS0 and TS00 analogously for expected total surplus. Then,
CS0 ≥ CS00 and TS0 > TS00 if I < ¯ I.
From Proposition 3 we know that the two manufacturers will establish an e-marketplace
if I < ¯ I. Proposition 4 then tells us that, if the two manufacturers choose to establish an
e-marketplace, the decision increases total surplus as well as consumer surplus.
A key to understanding this result is the way in which the establishment of an e-
marketplace aﬀects the manufacturers’ decision concerning platform sharing. Recall that
the establishment of an e-marketplace reduces each manufacturer’s communication cost per
supplier, which in turn increases the advantage of platform sharing. Hence, the establish-
ment of an e-marketplace cannot induce the manufacturers to switch from platform sharing
to non-platform sharing, and so we are left with the following three possibilities: (i) the two
manufacturers do not share a platform in the non-Marketplace Subgame, while they share a
platform in the Marketplace Subgame, (ii) the two manufacturers share a platform in both
subgames, and (iii) the two manufacturers share a platform in neither subgame.
The analyses for cases (ii) and (iii) are straightforward. In these cases, the establish-
ment of an e-marketplace does not aﬀect the manufacturers’ decision concerning platform
sharing, and so does not alter the degree of product variety. Since the establishment of an
e-marketplace reduces the manufacturers’ expected procurement costs by inducing them to
communicate with more potential suppliers, it increases consumer surplus in these cases.
Then, noting that each supplier’s expected proﬁt is zero due to free entry, the establishment
of an e-marketplace increases total surplus as well. In contrast, in case (i) the welfare impli-
cation is not immediately obvious because the establishment of an e-marketplace induces the
manufacturers to switch from non-platform sharing to platform sharing, and this results in
19the reduction of product variety. However, through the same logic as the one presented after
Proposition 2 in the previous section, we ﬁnd that this negative eﬀect on consumer surplus is
oﬀset by the positive eﬀect of platform sharing due to more intense competition between the
two manufacturers. Hence, in all three cases the establishment of an e-marketplace increases
consumer surplus as well as total surplus.
The establishment of an e-marketplace could be viewed as an anticompetitive activity
when accompanied by platform sharing, because it induces the manufacturers to reduce their
procurement costs at the expense of reduced product variety. We found, however, that the
establishment of an e-marketplace increases total surplus as well as consumer surplus in
our model. One would ﬁnd our theoretical framework suitable for investigating an industry
in which cost structures of suppliers can be approximated by constant marginal cost and
downstream manufacturers compete in the product market. Our analysis demonstrates that
the establishment of e-marketplace can be welfare-enhancing in such an environment. On
the other hand, one should apply a diﬀerent theoretical framework for analyzing an industry
in which the cost structure of suppliers is better approximated by increasing marginal cost
and manufacturers attempt to exercise oligopsony power.
As a ﬁnal point, another important issue concerning e-marketplaces is their impact on
the organization of ﬁrms. Do e-marketplaces induce outsourcing and vertical disintegration?
Our model can be extended to address this question. Suppose that each manufacturer has
an option of producing parts internally with a constant marginal cost of c ∈ (0,A). This
means that the internal production is cost ineﬃcient because the constant marginal cost of
each supplier s is given by cs = c − s. Assume that each manufacturer does not incur com-
munication costs if it produces parts internally. In this setting, if the communication cost
without e-marketplaces is suﬃciently high and an e-marketplace substantially reduces the
communication cost, the establishment of an e-marketplace induces outsourcing and vertical
20disintegration. This is consistent with Lucking-Reiley and Spulber (2001), who argue, “As
market transaction costs fall with the maturation of business-to-business e-commerce, out-
sourcing and vertical disintegration will occur, resulting in more independent entities along
the supply chain.”
5 Summary and conclusion
This paper investigated the trade-oﬀ between commonality of components and the degree of
product diﬀerentiation through analyzing a model that incorporates manufacturer-supplier
relationships with communication costs into a standard diﬀerentiated duopoly model. In our
model, the use of a common component (labelled as “platform sharing”) reduces the degree
of product diﬀerentiation. We found that, under platform sharing, each manufacturer can
choose a supplier from a larger number of potential suppliers, which lowers its expected
price for procurement. This is the advantage of platform sharing for manufacturers, and the
advantage increases as the level of communication cost decreases. The result is that the two
manufacturers share a platform if the reduction of product diﬀerentiation due to platform
sharing is relatively small, and each manufacturer’s cost for communicating with a potential
supplier is relatively small as well. The second part of the result is due to the inverse
relationship between the advantage of platform sharing and the level of communication cost.
It is widely recognized that recent advances in information technology (IT revolution) can
substantially reduce communication costs among ﬁrms. Our model suggests that the IT
revolution could be a reason for the recent prevalence of platform sharing in the automobile
industry, and predicts that similar phenomena would prevail in various other industries as
the IT revolution makes further progress.
In order to further investigate the eﬀect of the IT revolution, we analyzed an extension
21of our model that incorporates an option for the two manufacturers to jointly establish a
B2B electronic marketplace (e-marketplace) in order to reduce their costs for communicating
with potential suppliers, and explored its welfare implications. The establishment of an e-
marketplace could be viewed as an anticompetitive activity when accompanied by platform
sharing, because it induces the manufacturers to reduce their procurement costs at the
expense of reduced product variety due to platform sharing. We found, however, that the
establishment of an e-marketplace increases total surplus as well as consumer surplus even
when it is accompanied by platform sharing. Platform sharing intensiﬁes the competition
between the manufacturers, which in turn reduces the share of total surplus captured by the
manufacturers as their aggregate proﬁt. However, the level of their aggregate proﬁt is higher
under platform sharing if they choose to share a platform. This means that total surplus is
higher under platform sharing, which in turn implies that consumer surplus is also higher
because consumers capture larger share of total surplus under platform sharing.
Antitrust investigations require that the key characteristics of the industry under inves-
tigation be properly taken into account. Our theoretical framework developed in this paper
would be suitable for investigating an industry in which cost structures of suppliers can
be approximated by constant marginal cost and downstream manufacturers compete in the
product market. On the other hand, one should apply diﬀerent models for analyzing an in-
dustry in which cost structures of suppliers are better approximated by increasing marginal
cost and manufacturers attempt to exercise oligopsony power. In a future work, we plan to
develop a model that is suitable for analyzing such an environment.
22Appendix
We ﬁrst present the proof of our results described in the second and the third paragraph
of Section 3. Consider a Stage 4 subgame in which the two manufacturers did not share a
platform at Stage 1, and at Stage 3 each manufacturer i communicated with ni(≥ 1) suppliers
who specialized in part i at Stage 2. Suppose that each manufacturer i announced the price
pi such that pi > c + 1 at Stage 4, which determine the demand for each product qi. Each
manufacturer i procures qi units of the common parts through a procurement auction, which
can be translated into the following standard setting in auction theory: There is one seller
who has an object to sell. The seller faces ni bidders indexed by l = 1,...,ni. Each bidder l’s
value estimate for the object, denoted tl, is known only to bidder l, and is independently and
identically distributed according to a uniform distribution between qi(pi−c) and qi(pi−c+1).
The seller’s personal value estimate for the object is common knowledge and given by t0 = 0.
We apply Myerson (1981) (see in particular page 66-7), and obtain the following result:
The seller’s reserve price in an optimal auction is Max[qi(pi − c),
qi(pi−c+1)
2 ], which is equal
to qi(pi − c) because pi > c + 1. Then, in an optimal auction, the bidder with the highest
valuation purchases the object. The expected amount of money the bidder pays to the seller
is the second highest valuation among the ni bidders if ni ≥ 2, and qi(pi −c) if ni = 1. This
result indicates that, in our optimal procurement auction, each manufacturer i procures qi
units of the common part from a supplier who realized the lowest constant marginal cost,
and that the expected price of the common part is equal to the second lowest realization of
the constant marginal cost among the ni suppliers if ni ≥ 2 and c if ni = 1.
Let ˜ ci ∈ (0,A) denote the expected price at which manufacturer i purchases common
parts in the procurement auction in the SPNE outcome of the Stage 3 subgame. Note
that ˜ ci is each manufacturer i’s expected constant marginal cost of production as well.




4−γ2 ,i,j = 1,2,i 6= j,γ = γ0. Since c − k is the lower bound for
the realization of each supplier’s constant marginal cost, ˜ ci > c − k holds in equilibrium.
Assumption 3 then implies p∗
i > c+1. Then, the above analysis of the optimal procurement
auction in the Stage 4 subgame indicates that ˜ ci = c −
ni−1
ni+1k (i=1,2), which is the expected
value of the second lowest realization of the constant marginal cost among the ni suppliers if
ni ≥ 2 and c if ni = 1. This in turn implies that the SPNE outcome of the Stage 4 subgame
is characterized by (3), (4) and (5) presented in the second paragraph of Section 3. Also,
each supplier’s expected proﬁt in the SPNE outcome is πs
i(γ0,ni,nj) − f, which is deﬁned
by (6) in the third paragraph.
Next we present the proofs of the lemma and the propositions.
Proof of Lemma 1: We establish the following three claims:
Claim 1: There exists a unique real number, denoted y∗ ≡ n(γ,z), which is the unique



































and Assumption 3 implies that this second derivative takes a negative value for all yi ≥ 1








(1 + γ)(2 − γ)(4 − γ2)





(y + 1)2 − z. (12)
Let h(y) ≡ (A − c +
y−1
y+1k) 1
(y+1)2. Then h0(y) = 2
(y+1)3[
(2−y)k
y+1 − (A − c)]. Note
2+k−γ0
1−(γ0+x) >
1 + k > k
2, which implies Assumption 3 ⇒ k
2 − (A − c) < 0. Hence, h0(y) < 0 for all y ≥ 1.
Then, (i) there exists a unique real number y > 1 such that ∂
∂yiπm
i (γ,z,y,y) = 0, or (ii)
∂
∂yiπm
i (γ,z,y,y) < 0 for all y ≥ 1. This proves the claim. Q.E.D.
Claim 2: There exist unique values nc(≥ 1) and nd(≥ 1) such that 2πs
i(γ0+x,nc,nc)−f = 0
and πs
i(γ0,nd,nd) − f = 0. Furthermore, nc > nd ≥ 1.







y ≡ g(y). Note that g(y)








(2y+1)(y+1)k) < 0 for all y ≥ 1 by Assumption 3. Note also that 2πs
i(γ0 +x,1,1)−
f ≥ 0 and πs
i(γ0,1,1) − f ≥ 0 by Assumption 1. These together imply the existence and
uniqueness of nc(≥ 1) and nd(≥ 1). Also, we have 2
(1+γ0+x)[2−(γ0+x)] > 1
(1+γ0)(2−γ0) for all
γ0 ∈ (0,1) and x ∈ (0,1 − γ0). This implies nc > nd. Q.E.D.
Claim 3: Consider a Stage 2 subgame in which the two manufacturers shared (did not
share) a platform at Stage 1. There exists a symmetric SPNE outcome in which the two
manufacturers communicate with ˜ nc(z) ≡ Min[n(γ0 + x,z),nc] (˜ nd(z) ≡ Min[n(γ0,z),nd])
suppliers, and no other symmetric SPNE outcomes.
Proof of Claim 3: Consider a Stage 2 subgame in which the two manufacturers did not
share a platform at Stage 1.
(i) Suppose nd ≤ n(γ0,z). Consider a Stage 3 subgame in which nd suppliers entered
and specialized in part i (=1,2) at Stage 2. Noting that ∂2
∂(yi)2πm
i (γ0,z,yi,yj) < 0 and
∂2
∂(yj)2πm
j (γ0,z,yi,yj) < 0 for all yi ≥ 1 and yj ≥ 1, we have ∂
∂yiπm
i (γ0,z,nd,nd) ≥ 0 and
25∂
∂yjπm
j (γ0,z,nd,nd) ≥ 0. This implies that each manufacturer i communicates with nd sup-
pliers in the SPNE outcome of the Stage 3 subgame. Note that πs
i(γ0,nd,nd)−f = 0 holds,



























where Assumption 3 implies ∂
∂yiπs
i(γ,yi,yj) < 0 for all yi ≥ 1 and yj ≥ 1. Hence, the Stage 2
subgame has a symmetric SPNE outcome in which nd suppliers enter and specialize in part
i (=1,2) at Stage 2 and each manufacturer i communicates with nd suppliers at Stage 3.
Also, if n(6= nd) suppliers enter and specializes in part i (=1,2) at Stage 2, each supplier’s
expected proﬁt in the subsequent SPNE outcome of the Stage 3 subgame is not zero. Hence,
there are no other symmetric SPNE outcomes of the Stage 2 subgame.
(ii) Suppose nd > n(γ0,z). Note that πs
i(γ0,n(γ0,z),n(γ0,z)) − f > 0. Deﬁne n0 by
1
(1 + γ0)(2 − γ0)







n0 − f = 0. (14)
Note that n0 is unique and n0 > n(γ0,z). Consider a Stage 3 subgame in which n0 suppliers
entered and specialized in part i (=1,2) at Stage 2. Since n0 > n(γ0,z), each manufacturer
i communicates with n(γ0,z) suppliers in the symmetric SPNE outcome of the Stage 3
subgame. This in turn means that the Stage 2 subgame has a symmetric SPNE outcome in
which n0 suppliers enter and specialize in part i (=1,2) at Stage 2 and each manufacturer i
communicates with n(γ0,z) suppliers at Stage 3. Also, through the same reasoning as in (i)
above, there are no other symmetric SPNE outcomes of the Stage 2 subgame.
This completes the proof for the Stage 2 subgame in which the two manufacturers did not
share a platform at Stage 1. The proof for the other subgame is analogous. Q.E.D.
Claim 3 implies Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
26Proof of Proposition 1: Let πc(z) ≡ πm
i (γ0+x,z, ˜ nc(z), ˜ nc(z)) and πd(z) ≡ πm





n+1k)2−nz. We ﬁrst establish the following claim.
Claim 4: There exists a unique real number ¯ x ∈ (0,1 − γ0) such that πc(0) > πd(0) if and
only if x < ¯ x.
Proof of Claim 4: First note that n(γ,z) → +∞ as z → 0. Hence, if z = 0, ˜ nc(z) = nc and




n+1k)2. Note that nc > nd ≥ 1 (see
Claim 2), which implies πm
i (γ0,0,nc,nc) > πm
i (γ0,0,nd,nd) > πm






(1+γ)2(2−γ)4 < 0 for all γ ∈ (0,1), which implies that πm
i (γ0+x,0,nc,nc)
is continuous and strictly decreasing in x for all x ∈ (0,1 − γ0). This proves the claim.
Q.E.D.
Next, we identify some properties of n(γ,z). As shown in the proof of Claim 1, if
n(γ,z) > 1, n(γ,z) is uniquely determined by
4k(2 − γ2)
(1 + γ)(2 − γ)(4 − γ2)
h(n(γ,z)) − z = 0, (15)
where h(y) ≡ (A − c +
y−1
y+1k) 1
(y+1)2. Since h0(y) < 0 for all y ≥ 1, n(γ,z) is continuous in z
and exhibits the following property: There exist unique real numbers ˜ zc(> 0) and ˜ zd(> 0)
such that
(i) n(γ0 + x,z) = 1 for all z ≥ ˜ zc, n(γ0 + x,z) is strictly decreasing in z for all z < ˜ zc, and
n∗(γ0 + x,0) = +∞.













(1+γ0+x)[2−(γ0+x)][4−(γ0+x)2], which implies ˜ zd > ˜ zc(> 0) and n(γ0,z) >
n(γ0 + x,z) for all z < ˜ zd. This in turn means that there exist unique values zc and zd
27(0 < zc < zd) such that nc < n(γ0 + x,z) if and only if z < zc and nd < n(γ0,z) if and only
if z < zd.
We now establish Claim 5 below, which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Claim 5: Deﬁne ¯ x as in Claim 4.
(i) if x > ¯ x, πc(z) < πd(z) for all z ∈ [0, ¯ z).
(ii) if x < ¯ x, there exists a unique value z∗ ∈ (0, ¯ z] such that πc(z) > πd(z) if and only if
z < z∗. There exists a range of parameterizations in which z∗ < ¯ z holds.
Proof of Claim 5: First note that πc(z) and πd(z) are continuous and strictly decreasing
in z for all z ∈ [0, ¯ z). Suppose x < ¯ x. Then there exists a unique real number z∗ ∈ (0, ¯ z]
such that πc(z) > πd(z) for all z ∈ [0,z∗) and πc(z∗) = πd(z∗) if z∗ < ¯ z.
Pick any z ∈ (0, ¯ z). Note that nc → +∞ and nd → +∞ as f → 0. Then, holding all
parameter values except f ﬁxed, we can pick small enough f > 0 such that ˜ nc(z) = n(γ0+x,z)




(1+γ0+x)[2−(γ0+x)]2 ⇒ πc(z) < πd(z). This implies
that there exists a range of parameterizations in which z∗ < ¯ z holds.
In what follows, we will show that πc(z) < πd(z) for all z ∈ (z∗, ¯ z) if z∗ < zc.
(i) nd < nc ⇒ πc(z) < πd(z) for all z ∈ (z∗,zc].
(ii) Consider z ∈ (zc,zd). If n(γ0 + x,z) ≤ nd, we have πm
i (γ0,z,nd,nd) ≥ πm
i (γ0,z,n(γ0 +
x,z),n(γ0 + x,z)) > πm
i (γ0 + x,z,n(γ0 + x,z),n(γ0 + x,z)), which implies πc(z) < πd(z).
Now, pick any z0 ∈ (zc,zd) such that n(γ0+x,z0) > nd, and pick any z00 ∈ (z∗,zc). Suppose





˜ πc(z00). We have (˜ πc(z00)−πc(z0))−(πd(z00)−πd(z0)) = (n(γ0+x,z0)−nd)(z0−z00) > 0. Then,
πc(z00) > ˜ πc(z00) and πc(z0) ≥ πd(z0) together imply πc(z00) > πd(z00). This is a contradiction
to (i), and so πc(z0) < πd(z0) must hold. This in turn implies πc(z) < πd(z) for all z ∈ (zc,zd).
(iii) We have πm
i (γ0 + x,z,n(γ0 + x,z),n(γ0 + x,z)) < πm
i (γ0,z,n(γ0,z),n(γ0,z)) for all
z ∈ [0, ¯ z), which implies πc(z) < πd(z) for all z ∈ [zd, ¯ z).
28(i)-(iii) together imply πc(z) < πd(z) for all z ∈ (z∗, ¯ z) if z∗ < zc. Through a similar
procedure, it can be shown that the same result holds if z∗ ≥ zc.
Finally, suppose x > ¯ x. Through a similar procedure, it can be shown that πc(z) < πd(z)
for all z ∈ [0, ¯ z). This completes the proof of the claim and the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the symmetric SPNE outcome of the Stage 2 subgame
in which the two manufacturers shared a platform at Stage 1. In the equilibrium, each
manufacturer i sells qi(γ0 + x, ˜ nc(z), ˜ nc(z)) ≡ qc units of product i at the price of pi(γ0 +
x, ˜ nc(z), ˜ nc(z)). Then, we ﬁnd CSc = (1 + γ0 + x)q2
c = CS(γ0 + x, ˜ nc(z)), where
CS(γ,n) ≡
1









[(1+γ)(2−γ)2]2 > 0 for all
γ ∈ (0,1], and so 1
(1+γ0+x)[2−(γ0+x)]2 > 1
(1+γ0)(2−γ0)2. Note also, x < ¯ x and z < z∗ ⇒ πc(z) >
πd(z) ⇒ ˜ nc(z) > ˜ nd(z). Hence, we ﬁnd CS(γ0 + x, ˜ nc(z)) > CS(γ0, ˜ nd(z)). Since suppliers’
expected proﬁts are zero in the equilibrium, πc(z) > πd(z) and CSc > CSd together imply
TSc > TSd if x < ¯ x and z < z∗. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Deﬁne Πm(z) ≡ Max[πc(z),πd(z)], which is strictly decreasing in
z for all z ∈ [0, ¯ z) because πc(z) and πd(z) are both strictly decreasing in z for all z ∈ [0, ¯ z).
In the equilibrium of the entire game, the two manufacturers establish an e-marketplace if
Πm(z0−∆)−I > Πm(z0). Deﬁne ¯ I ≡ Πm(z0−∆)−Πm(z0)(> 0), and we obtain the desired
result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: First note that free entry of suppliers implies that each supplier’s
expected proﬁt is zero in the equilibrium. Suppose I < ¯ I. Since Πm(z0 − ∆) − I > Πm(z0)
holds, CS0 ≥ CS00 ⇒ TS0 > TS00. In what follows, we prove CS0 ≥ CS00. Proposition 1
implies that the following three cases exhaust all possible cases.
29Case 1: The two manufacturers share a platform in the equilibrium of neither subgame.
In this case, CS0 = CS(γ0, ˜ nd(z0 − ∆)) and CS00 = CS(γ0, ˜ nd(z0)), where CS(·,·) is as
deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 2. Noting that ˜ nd(z) is (weakly) decreasing in z, we have
CS0 ≥ CS00.
Case 2: The two manufacturers share a platform in the equilibrium of both subgames. In
this case, CS0 = CS(γ0 + x, ˜ nc(z0 − ∆)) and CS00 = CS(γ0 + x, ˜ nc(z0)). Noting that ˜ nc(z)
is (weakly) decreasing is z, we have CS0 ≥ CS00.
Case 3: The two manufacturers share (do not share) a platform in the equilibrium of Mar-
ketplace subgame (non-Marketplace subgame). In this case, CS0 = CS(γ0 + x, ˜ nc(z0 − ∆))
and CS00 = CS(γ0, ˜ nd(z0)). Noting 1
(1+γ0+x)[2−(γ0+x)]2 > 1
(1+γ0)(2−γ0)2, ˜ nc(z0 − ∆) > ˜ nd(z0) ⇒
CS0 > CS00.
Claim 6: In case 3, ˜ nc(z0 − ∆) > ˜ nd(z0) holds.
Proof of Claim 6: Since ˜ nd(z) is (weakly) decreasing in z, it suﬃces to show ˜ nc(z0 −∆) >
˜ nd(z0−∆). Suppose, to the contrary, ˜ nc(z0−∆) ≤ ˜ nd(z0−∆). Then, πm
i (γ0,z0−∆, ˜ nd(z0−
∆), ˜ nd(z0−∆)) ≥ πm
i (γ0,z0−∆, ˜ nc(z0−∆), ˜ nc(z0−∆)) > πm
i (γ0+x,z0−∆, ˜ nc(z0−∆), ˜ nc(z0−
∆)). This is a contradiction, because, in case 3, the two manufacturers share a platform in
the equilibrium of Marketplace subgame. Q.E.D.
Hence, CS0 ≥ CS00 holds in all three cases. This completes the proof of the proposition.
Q.E.D.
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